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POST-RELEASE ATTACKS ON INVALID FEDERAL
CONVICTIONS: OBSTACLES TO REDRESS BY
CORAM NOBIS
THE effects of a felony conviction extend beyond the period of custody.
After a prisoner has served the full term of his sentence, parole, or probation,
he may be subject to civil disabilities,' in addition to the social and economic
consequences of having been a "convict." Furthermore, his conviction may
even lead to additional imprisonment. Upon his release another jurisdiction
may recommit him on the ground that the criminal act for which he was
convicted violated the terms of an earlier parole or probation.2 Moreover,
should an ex-prisoner subsequently be convicted of another crime, his prior
conviction may contribute to increased criminal penalties under an habitual
offender statute.3 To avoid these consequences he may seek to attack the
-alidity of his conviction and have judgment vacated.
However, the ex-prisoner who attacks the validity of a federal conviction
after serving his full sentence under it, may find that all ordinary avenues
of redress are closed.4 The statutory period for an appeal,6 for a motion in
arrest of judgment,6 or for a new trial 7 will probably have passed. A motion
1. Former convicts may lose the right to vote or to hold office, and may be in-
eligible for military service. They may be denied access to professions such as law and
medicine, or to licensed occupations limited to persons with certain moral qualifications.
Released prisoners under probationary restrictions may even have additional limitaticns
on their choice of occupations. Ex-convicts who are aliens may be ineligible for naturali-
zation and may be subject to deportation. See Notes, 59 YALE U. 786 (1950) ; 37 VA.
L. REv. 105 (1951).
2. See Roberts v. United States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946) (Florida parolee, con-
victed of federal crime, returned to Florida prison after release from federal penitentiary).
3. See United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cort. gra:tcd, 345 U.S. 974
(1953) ; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944).
4. A similar legal problem arises when a petitioner is imprisoned under one federal
conviction, but wishes to challenge the validity of another, the sentence under which he
has not yet begun to serve. In order to become eligible for parole under the prior con-
viction, he may have to have the later one vacated. See United States v. Howell, 103
F. Supp. 714 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 199 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1952). Section 2255 of the
Judicial Code is unavailable since the petitioner is not in custody under the sentence he
is attacking. Crow v. United States, 186 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1950). Habeas corpus is
also unavailable since the petitioner is legally imprisoned under the prior conviction, the
validity of which he does not question. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). There-
fore, relief must be sought by the writ of error coram nobis.
5. An appeal must be taken within ten days after entry of judgment, or within ten
days after entry of an order denying a motion for a new trial or a motion in arrest of
judgment. FED. R. CRn. P. 37(a).
6. "The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within 5 days after determina-
tion of guilt or within such further time as the court may fix during the S day period.Y
FE. R. CaRm. P. 34.
7. A motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is limited to
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to correct an illegal sentence 8 is available only when a sentence is not in
conformity with the statute under which pronounced, and presupposes a valid
conviction.0 Neither the motion procedure for vacating sentence under Sec-
tion 2255 of the Judicial Code 10 nor habeas corpus 11 is available to one who
is not in custody 12 under the judgment he is attacking."' Consequently, if
an ex-prisoner is to secure adequate relief from an invalid federal convic-
tion 14 he must resort to the writ of error coram nobis.
two years after final judgment. On any other grounds it must be brought within five
days after verdict. FED. R. CRim. P. 33.
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
9. In re Shepherd, 195 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1952); Garrison v. Reeves, 116 F.2d 978
(8th Cir. 1941). But cf. Byrd v. Pescor, 163 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 846 (1948); D'Ostroph v. Pescor, 7 F.R.D. 569 (W.D. Mo. 1947), appeal dis-
missed, 173 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 926 (1949). In the Byrd case,
supra, the Eighth Circuit denied habeas corpus, holding that Rule 35 gave the petitioner
an adequate remedy in the sentencing court to challenge the validity of a conviction.
However, in Byrd, the petitioner was in custody under the sentence attacked.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. 1952).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (Supp. 1952).
12. The Federal Parole Statute states that a parolee is in the legal custody of the
Attorney-General. 18 U.S.C. §4203 (Supp. 1952). It would seem, therefore, that a
parolee could attack a conviction by habeas corpus or section 2255. See United States v.
Bradford, 194 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 979 (1952). But cf. Factor
v. Fox, 175 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1949) (habeas corpus denied because petitioner not in
custody of warden respondent) ; Weber v. Squire, 315 U.S. 810 (1942), detying cert. to
124 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1941) (same); Van Meter v. Sanford, 99 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.
1938) (same).
A probationer is "under supervision." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3653, 3655 (Supp. 1952). But for
purposes of habeas corpus and section 2255 he is not "in custody." United States v. Brad-
ford, supra. But see United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7, 11 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
13. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) (habeas corpus) ; United States v. Lavelle,
194 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1952) (§ 2255) ; Lopez v. United States, 186 F.2d 707 (9th Cir.
1950) (§ 2255) ; Crow v. United States, 186 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1950) (§ 2255). Contra:
Griffin v. United States, 173 F.2d 909, rehearing denied, 175 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1949)
(§ 2255); Cf. United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder, 183 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1950)
(habeas corpus).
14. A person who successfully attacks the validity of his conviction subjects himself
to the possibility of additional punishment. He can be retried, reconvicted, and resentenced
for the same offense. See generally, Whalen, Resentence Without Credit For Time
Served: Unequal Protection Of The Laws, 35 MiNN. L. REV. 239 (1951) ; Note, 12 U.
oF DErROIT L.J. 135 (1949). Successful attack on a judgment by either direct or col-
lateral proceedings is deemed a waiver of immunity from further prosecution on the same
charge. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900) ; Robinson v. United States, 144
F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), aff'd in part, 324 U.S. 282 (1945).
Where there is a reconviction for the same offense, the federal practice is to credit
time previously served. Murphy v. Massachusetts, supra; Howell v. United States, 199
F.2d 366 (4th Cir.), affirming 103 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.W. Va. 1952). But cf. McDowell
v. State, 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947). However, such practice is not sanctioned
by statute and may depend upon the sentencing court's discretion. For a suggestion that
it is possible to have time served under an invalid conviction credited to a valid con-
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Although the law is not settled, 10 it appears that federal district courts
have jurisdiction to entertain coram nobis proceedings. 10 The purpose of the
writ is to vacate judgments obtained without due process of law. 17 It is
viction for an entirely different offense, see Griffin v. United States, 173 F.2d 909, 910
(6th Cir. 1949). See also Youst v. United States, 151 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1945) (credit-
ing time served under illegal sentences to legal sentences under different counts of the
same indictment) ; Ekberg v. United States, 167 F2d 30 (1st Cir. 1948) (same). Even
if time is credited the new sentence may be more severe than the original one. 'Murphy
M: assachusetts, supra; King v. United States, 9S F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 193S). Further-
more, eligibility for parole may be deferred because the new sentence runs as of the time
it is pronounced and not from the time of the invalid sentence. Debenque Y. United
States, 85 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 681 (1936). However, for a sug-
gestion that a prisoner need not serve in toto more than the maximum period of time
provided by the statute, see King v. United States, stpra at 295 n.3. See also Note, 45
MICH. L Ruv. 912, 913 (1947).
15. The Supreme Court has declined to decide whether coram nobis is available in
federal criminal cases. See United States v. Ayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914); United
States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947). The issue has been further complicated
by the enactment of section 2255. For discussion of the problems involved, see Donnelly,
Uncon2victing The Iwcent, 6 VAND. L. Rnv. 20, 24 (1952); Note, 59 Yim UJ. 786
(1950).
16. United States v. 'Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. grantcd, 345 U.S. 974
(1953) ; Allen v. United States, 162 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1947), findings an renand aff'd,
170 F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. K-0 (1949); Roberts v. United
States, 158 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946) ; Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1946) ; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944); Robinson v. Johnston, 118
F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1941), Judgment vacated and cause remandcd, 316 U.S. 649 (1942),
re'zd on other grounds, 130 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1942). Confrca: United States Y. Kersch-
man, 201 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1953).
17. Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1946) ; United States -. Steese,
144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944). See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914);
Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cr.), cert. den:ied, 337 U.S. 905 (1949) ;
Pierce v. United States, 157 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. de:ied, 329 U.S. 814 (1947).
At early common law the writ was available in both civil and criminal cases to cor-
rect certain errors of fact not appearing in the record and unknown to the defendant,
which, had they been known by the court, would have precluded the judgment rendered.
See Donnelly, supra note 15, at 24. It appears that in criminal cases the writ could also
be used to correct errors of law. See United States v. Plumer, 27 Fed. Cas. 561, 573,
No. 16,056 (C.C.D. Mass. 1859) ; Queen v. O'Connell, 7 Ir. L. R. 261, 357n. (1344). With
the growth of the criminal law in the American courts the writ was extended to apply to
situations where fraud or duress in the proceedings rendered the judgment a nullity.
Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (182); State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 Pac. 3S (1893).
At the same time, many of the grounds for which coram nobis once had lain were provided
for by statutory forms such as the right of appeal and the motion for a new trial. In de-
fining the scope of the writ in United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914), Chief
Justice Hughes stated that the writ, if available, would lie "where the errors were of the
most fundamental character, that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular and
invalid." Since that time the scope of coram nobis has been further extended by holdings
of the Supreme Court that deprivation of constitutional rights upon trial deprives the court
of jurisdiction and renders judgments so obtained invalid. See Fuld, The Writ of Error
Corarm Nobis, 117 N.Y.UJ. 2212, col. 1, 2230, col 1, 2248, col 1 (1947). Holtzoff, Collateral
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available on such grounds as denial of the right to counsel,'8 insanity or
mental incompetence at the time of the plea or trial,19 knowing use of per-
jured testimony 20 or suppression of evidence by the prosecution,21 fraud or
duress in obtaining a plea of guilty,2 2 or mob domination at the trial.23 But
Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REv. 26 (1945). Thus it appears that
the writ, which at one time was used to correct simple errors of fact such as misprisions
of the clerk in the record, is now available to challenge the validity of a conviction on juris-
dictional or constitutional grounds. See Pierce v. United States, supra at 848; United States
v. Steese, supra at 442 (concurring opinion). The principal distinction between coram
nobis and section 2255 appears to be that the former is not limited by the "in custody" re-
quirement. Moreover, coram nobis may be available to call to the trial court's attention new
facts of such a vital nature as to prove that the decision could not possibly have been cor-
rect on its merits. United States v. Monjar, 64 F. Supp. 746 (D. Del. 1946) ; accord, lIx
parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300 (E.D.S.C. 1949) ; Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375
(1928). Contra: Kelly v. United States, 138 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 855 (1945) ; Reid v. United States, 149 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1945). See also Waldron
v. United States, 146 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1944) (judgment under an unconstitutional statute
vacated); United States v. Well, 46 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Ark. 1942) (judgment vacated
on a matter of law).
It is clear that coram nobis has outgrown its humble origin, but the tyranny of labels
persists. The clich6 with which the scope of the writ was described centuries ago still re-
turns to plague the courts. Because of the perpetuity of the phrase "errors of fact" some
courts have incorrectly analogized the writ to a motion for a new trial with unfortunate
consequences to the petitioner. See Bell v. United States, 129 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 665 (1942) (request to be present at hearing denied) ; United States v. Lan-
dicho, 72 F. Supp. 425 (D. Alaska 1947) (two year period of limitation applied). If analo-
gies must be made on procedural points, they should be predicated upon section 2255 which
is substantially similar to the modern writ of coram nobis. See United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205 (1952).
18. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 974
(1953) ; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944). Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938).
19. Allen v. United States, 162 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1947), findings on remand aff'd, 170
F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 880 (1949) ; Roberts v. United States, 158
F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1946) ; Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941), judgmcnt
vacated and cause renunded, 316 U.S. 649 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 130 F.2d 202 (9th
Cir. 1942).
20. Garrison v. United States, 154 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1946) ; see Tinkoff v. United
States, 129 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1942) ; cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
21. Habeas corpus cases hold that suppression of evidence by the prosecution is a denial
of due process, United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. I11.
1949) ; see In re Curtis, 36 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nor. Curtis v. Rives, 123
F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941). It would appear by analogy that coram nobis is available on that
ground in the federal courts. See Howell v. United States, 172 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949).
22. United States v. Mahoney, 43 F. Supp. 943 (W.D. La. 1942) (by implication).
Cf. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (19-41).
23. Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882) ; State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 Pac. 38
(1893). Similarly, federal habeas corpus cases hold that mob domination renders the pro-
ceeding invalid. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309, 335 (1915). That habeas corpus and coram nobis are analogous, see note 21 supra.
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the writ's effectiveness has been impaired by a phalanx of court-imposed
obstacles.
The foremost impediment to relief is the requirement that the petitioner
show not only that he was deprived of due process, but also that he is inno-
cent or has some other valid defense.2 4 This requirement originated in
United States v. Moore.25 There the Seventh Circuit relied on the equity
rule that a defendant may not have an invalid judgment vacated unless he shows
a meritorious defense so that a retrial will produce a different result. 0 The
policy of this rule in equity is to prevent useless litigation and secure the
finality of civil judgments.2 7 But in the criminal law, where the necessity
of securing due process overrides considerations of finality, the rule is in-
appropriate. The Moore case also relied on Indiana precedent to support the
innocence requirement.2 8 In that state, coram nobis is used not only to re-
dress fundamental procedural defects, as in the federal courts,3 but also to
grant relief to those validly convicted who are subsequently able to prove
their innocence.30 Thus a petitioner there must allege either that he is inno-
cent 31 or that he was deprived of due process.3 2 Indiana cases require proof
24. United States v. Farnsworth, 198 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 915
(1953) ; United States v. Bice, 177 F.2d 843 (4th Cir.), affryning 84 F. Supp. 290 (D. Md.
1949) ; United States v. Rockower, 171 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 931
(1949) ; United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948).
Contra: United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 974 (19.3);
Garrison .% United States, 154 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Steese, 144 F2d
439 (3d Cir. 1944).
25. 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. deieed, 334 U.S. 849 (1943).
26. For the equity rule, see Glinski v. United States, 93 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Mass.
Benefit Life Ins. v. Lohmiller, 74 Fed. 23 (7th Cir. 1,96) ; Emcee Corp. v. George, 293 Ill.
App. 240, 12 N.E.2d 333 (1937) ; Fitzgerald v. Power, "25 I1. App. 118 (1922) ; Braun v.
Quinn, 112 Neb. 485, 199 N.W. 828 (1924). The cases supra are cited in United States v.
Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948).
27. See cases cited note 26 supra.
23. See United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
849 (1948), and cases therein cited.
29. See note 17supra.
30. "The rule is that the extraordinary relief afforded by a proceeding in the nature
of a writ of coranx nobis will not be granted in a criminal case after trial and conviction,
except where it dearly appears that the petitioner had a valid defense in the facts of the
case, but which, without negligence on his part, was not made because of duress, fraud, or
excusable mistake; or that he was prevented from asserting and enjoying some legal right
through duress, or fraud, or excusable mistake, these facts not appearing on the face of the
record, and being such as, if known in season, would have prevented the rendition and entry
of the judgment in question." Wheeler v. State, 158 Ind. 687, 696, 63 N.E. 975, 978 (1902)
(emphasis supplied). See Note, Habeas Corpus and Corans Arobis in Indiana, 26 InD. LJ.
529 (1951).
31. Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375 (1928), overruled in part, Stephenson v.
State, 205 Ind. 141, 196-7, 179 N.E. 633, 186 N.E. 293, 295 (1933) ; see George v. State, 211
Ind. 429,439,6 N.E.2d 336,340 (1937).
32. Dearing v. State, 229 Ind. 131, 95 N.E.2d 832 (1951) ; Sanders v. State, 85 Ind.
318 (1888).
1953]
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of innocence vhen that is the petitioner's ground for relief.8  Moore mis-
interpreted these decisions in holding that both elements of proof were neces-
sary to support federal coram nobis.
34
The rationale for applying the innocence requirement to coram nobis is
that unless a retrial would result in a different verdict it would be vain and
idle to set aside the judgment.35 But a defendant is entitled to his day in
court protected by all the constitutional safeguards guaranteed the accused.
If he has never been validly adjudged guilty, to require him to prove his
innocence before a court is to shift the burden of proof 30 and deprive him of
a valid trial by jury. Until such a trial is had an accused should be con-
sidered innocent.3 7 The only issue which is relevant and which the petitioner
should have to prove is that he was deprived of due process. 38
33. Shipley v. State, 210 Ind. 253, 2 N.E.2d 389 (1936) ; cases cited note 31 supra.
34. Moore relies heavily on Shipley v. State, supra note 33. While Moore
was seeking coram nobis on the ground that he had been deprived of due process,
Shipley alleged that he was innocent. The Shipley case decided merely that the allegations,
even if true, would not establish Shipley's innocence.
In United States v. Monjar, 64 F. Supp. 746 (D. Del. 1946), a federal coram nobis hear-
ing was granted on grounds of innocence. Accord, Ex parie Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300
(E.D.S.C. 1949). Contra; Reid v. United States, 149 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1945); Kelly v.
United States, 138 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 855 (1945).
35. See United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102, 104 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
849 (1948).
36. State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 Pac. 38 (1893). "And further, held, that the
question of the guilt or innocence of the accused in such a case is not a necessary question
to be determined in the case; that a mob cannot, by compelling a person accused of crime
to plead guilty and to be sentenced to imprisonment and hard labor in the penitentiary, so
shift the burden of proof from the state to the accused as to compel the accused to prove his
innocence, and to prove it by a preponderance of the testimony, and to relieve the state from
proving his guilt, and from proving it by evidence sufficient to remove every reasonable
doubt." Id. at 538-9, 32 Pac. at 42.
It would seem that the duty of the Government to establish proof of guilt is a require-
ment of due process within the scope of the Fifth Amendment. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 802-03 (1951) (dissenting opinion). See also Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,
469 (1943).
37. If the defendant shows that he has been deprived of due process, the judgment
should be vacated and the criminal proceeding returned to the indictment stage. The govern-
ment may then proceed in its attempt to prove the defendant guilty. State v. Calhoun, 50
Kan. 523, 32 Pac. 38 (1893) ; Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882).
38. "It should be patent from the foregoing that it is not the function of this Court to
concern itself, in a proceeding of this nature, with the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.
A guilty person, in custody pursuant to a void judgment, is just as improperly deprived of
his liberty as is an innocent person." Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866, 869 (N.D.
Ill. 1952) (motion to vacate judgment under section 2255).
The innocence requirement has been applied to section 2255 in cases relying on the
authority of United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849
(1948). This requirement seriously threatens to impair that section which is substantially
the modern equivalent for habeas corpus as the means of attacking invalid federal convic-
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Another equity rule 39 which has been transposed into the law of coram
nobis is the doctrine of laches. 40 First appearing in federal cases as dicta, 1
it now threatens to destroy the efficacy of the writ. An e-x-prisoner who first
learns of his rights after release from custody will have little immediate
reason to attack his conviction.- Yet, if he does not attack it until he suffers
some additional penalty,4 3 he may be barred from relief by his delay.44 The
argument for application of the laches doctrine is based on considerations
of finality: witnesses die or their memories grow dim, and law enforcement
officers will be handicapped if they must re-prosecute.40 But delay works
tions when one is in custody. United States v. Morris, 83 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C. 1949);
accord, United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951). Sce United States v. Bremer,
9th Cir., Sept. 30, 1953; Ziebart v. United States, 192 F.2d S04, S05 (5th Cir. 1951) ; United
States v. Bowen, 94 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 192 F.2d 515, 516 (5th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 943 (1952) ; United States v. Calp, 83 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D.
Md 1949). Contra: Allen v. United States, supra.
39. See 'Mass. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lohmiller, 74 Fed. 23 (7th Cir. 1S96) ; Thorpe v.
,Vm. Filene's Sons Co., 40 F.2d 269 (D. Mass. 1930).
40. See Farnsworth v. United States, 193 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denicd, 344 U.S.
915 (1953) ; United States v. Bice, 177 F.2d 843 (4th Cir.), affirming 84 F. Supp. 290 (D.
Md. 1949); United States v. Rockower, 171 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denicd, 337 U.S.
931 (1949) ; United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849
(1948).
41. Sec Spaulding v. United States, 155 F.2d 919, 921 (6th Cir. 1946) ; United States
v. Wright, 56 F. Supp. 489, 492 (E.D. IlL 1944) ; United States v. Buhler, 48 F. Supp. 159,
160 (M.D. Pa. 1942) ; United States v. Mahoney, 43 F. Supp. 943, 945 (,V.D. La. 1942).
42. However, an illegally convicted ex-convict may desire to have the judgment vacated
by coraxn nobis proceedings so that he might then petition the sentencing court for a certi-
ficate of innocence, and thus become eligible to bring an action in the United States Court of
Claims for indemnification under the Federal Erroneous Convictions Act, 23 U.S.C. § 2513
(Supp. 1952). See United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) ; Donnelly,
Unconvieting The Innocent, 6 V.No. L.J. 20, 33 (1952).
43. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
44. Farnsworth v. United States, 198 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 915
(1953) (alternate holding-17 years after conviction) ; United States v. Bice, 177 F2d 843
(4th Cir.), affirmig 84 F. Supp. 290 (D. Md. 1949) (alternate holding-23 years after con-
viction) ; United States v. Rockower, 171 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
931 (1949) (alternate holding-18 years after conviction) ; United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d
102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948) (alternate holding-IS years after convic-
tion). Contra: United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 974
(1953) (13 years after conviction) ; United States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1944)
(9 years after conviction).
It is not clear in what manner the doctrine of laches is applied. In some cases it appears
that relief is completely barred by the lapse of an arbitrary number of years after convic-
tion. See United States v. Bice, supra; Farnsworth v. United States, supra. Other cases
seem to indicate that a presumption of laches arises after an unspecified time, and that the
petitioner has the burden of negating the presumption by showing diligence in asserting his
rights. See United States v. Moore, supra; United States v. Rockower, supra.
45. See United States v. Moore, supra note 44, at 105; Irwin v. State, 220 Ind. 223,
246, 41 N.E2d 809, 815-16 (1942) ("All limitation upon the assertion of rights or the
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equally to the disadvantage of the petitioner who has the burden of proving
the judgment void.46 And the inconvenience to the prosecution is minimal
when compared to the injustice suffered by the illegally convicted petitioner. 41
An unfair trial should not become unassailable through mere passage of time
or because of a petitioner's failure to ascertain or assert his rights.48 Laches
should be used to prevent not perpetuate inequity.
A convict in state custody under an habitual offender sentence predicated
upon a prior federal conviction may encounter a further obstacle to coram
nobis if he attacks the validity of that conviction. Even if he is not barred
from relief because of laches or the proof of innocence requirement, he may
be denied redress because of misapplication of the rule in Gayes v. New
York.49 In that case, the Supreme Court held that where a state gave a
convict an opportunity when sentencing him as a second offender to question
the validity of a prior state conviction, later refusal by the state to permit col-
lateral attack on the first conviction did not violate due process of law. By a pro-
cess of legal alchemy that decision has been interpreted to mean that opportunity
to attack a prior federal conviction is available in a state court at the time of
habitual offender sentencing, and that federal relief at a later time is there-
fore precluded. 50 Even if such opportunity were available in the state court,51
nothing in the Gayes case requires that federal relief be precluded thereafter.
Gayes holds that a state's failure to provide later relief does not violate the
granting of remedies is based upon sound public policy, the reasons for which need
no elaboration. . . .These limitations operate upon just and unjust claims alike. It has
been thought necessary to deny the right to the assertion of even just claims in order
that there may be finality and repose. It has not been supposed that the machinery of
human justice can operate with perfection and exactness.") This reasoning has been
overruled in State v. Lindsey,-Ind.-, 106 N.E.2d 230 (1952).
46. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 974 (1953)
cf. Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (hearing under section 2255).
47. See Desmond J., in People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290,295,97 N.E. 2d 908,910 (1951) :
"The possibility, or probability, that such trials will be numerous, is no answer at all, and
will not be further noticed herein. Likewise, as to the fact that defendant is a convict, and
the opposing affiants court officers. Defendant has been denied his day in court, and we must
see that he has it, be he right or wrong, truthful or lying, good citizen or bad."
48. "As to the Government's remaining contention, i.e., that Allen did not assert his
constitutional right with due diligence and, therefore, is not entitled to relief, the Court is
unable to perceive its applicability. A void judgment is as void today as it was twenty years
ago. No aging process, whereby a void judgment improves as to stature and validity by
the passage of time, can properly be interposed." Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866,
869 (N.D. Ill. 1952) (motion to vacate judgment under section 2255).
49. 332 U.S. 145 (1947).
50. Farnsworth v. United States, 198 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 915
(1953) ; United States v. Bice, 177 F.2d 843 (4th Cir.), aflrming 84 F. Supp. 290 (D. Md.
1949) ; United States v. Rockower, 171 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denicd, 337 U.S. 931
(1949) ; United States v. Moore, 166 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 849 (1948).
Contra: United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 974 (1953).
51. But see note 54 infra.
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Fourteenth Amendment.52 It does not suggest such a practice for the federal
courts.53
Furthermore, it appears that opportunity to attack a prior federal con-
viction is not available in state courts. The New York Court of Appeals has
held that until a federal conviction is vacated in the federal courts, it will
serve as an effective predicate for sentencing under the New York Habitual
Offender statute.5 4 The procedure which the courts should follow is to re-
quire the petitioner first to attack his federal conviction in the federal district
court where he was sentenced, and if successful, then to apply to the state
courts for resentencing as a first offender.5 The primary obligation to re-
move the consequences of an invalid judgment should be on the court which
rendered it.
In the recent case of United States v. Morgan 5O the Second Circuit con-
spicuously omitted reference to the obstacles previously imposed on coram
nobis relief. Morgan had been sentenced by a New York court as a second
offender on the basis of a prior federal conviction. When opportunity to
attack that conviction was denied him by the New York courts, he applied
for coram nobis in the federal courts. Morgan's petition apparently failed
to allege his innocence and also failed to assert his freedom from laches
although it was filed thirteen years after his federal conviction, nine years
after release from federal imprisonment, and two years after sentencing in
New York. The Second Circuit recognized that the federal courts are the
proper forum for attacking an invalid federal conviction. Moreover, the
court apparently overruled sub silentio a previous decision requiring proof
of innocence and freedom from laches,5 7 by overlooking the omission of these
52. 332 U.S. 145, 148-9 (1947). The New York Court of Appeals, correctly interpret-
ing the Gayes case, has distinguished it on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Bojinoff v.
People, 299 N.Y. 145, 85 N.E.2d 909 (1949) (failure to attack a prior New York convic-
tion at time of sentence as a second offender not a bar to coram nobis proceedings at a later
date), 16 BRooKrYN L. Rz,. 124 (1949).
53. Four justices dissented in Gayes on the ground that the state procedure, as inter-
preted, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. "I am unwilling to subscribe to such a doctrine
of forfeitures concerning constitutional rights, which in the extreme circumstances of this
case seems to me shocking." Justice Rutledge, with whom Justices Black, Douglas, and
Murphy concurred, 332 U.S. 145, 151 (1947) (dissenting opinion). Because of the higher
standards of criminal procedure required under the Fifth Amendment, it is possible that if
federal procedure had been involved the result would have been different.
54. People v. 'McCullough, 300 N.Y. 107, 89 N.E.2d 335 (1949), cert. dmeid, 339 U.S.
924 (1950).
55. See United States ex rel Lavelle . Fay, 205 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1953); United
States v. Morgan, 202 F-2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 974 (1953) ; People v. Mc-
Cullough, 300 N.Y. 107, 89 N.E2d 335 (1949), cert. decld, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
56. 202 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 345 U.S. 974 (1953), 66 Hnv. L REv. 1137,
53 Co. L. REv. 737.
57. United States v. Rockower. 171 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 931
(1949).
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allegations in the petition. The opinion indicates that the only requisite to
relief is a showing that the petitioner had been deprived of due process.58
High standards of criminal procedure require that an effective means of
obtaining relief from invalid convictions be available so long as their con-
sequences are felt. Supreme Court affirmance of Morgan will provide such
a remedy by paving the way for a more available and effective writ of error
coram nobis.
58. United States v. Morgan, 202 F2d 67, 68-9 (2d Cir.), cert. grantcd, 345 U.S. 974
(1953). See also Allen v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. 111. 1952).
